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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this master´s thesis is to study short-term effects of stock repurchase 
programs.  The study aims to document effects during different time periods of stock 
buyback programs using actual buybacks, following periods when firms do not acquire 
any shares. This allows to expand ongoing research and show what effects does quitting 
repurchases have on the stock price.  
 
Thesis uses Finnish data to achieve the goal to examine day-to-day effects because of 
the regulations in Finland which demand companies to announce daily buybacks before 
the next trading day. Data have been hand-picked from Nasdaq Helsinki company 
releases using time period of 2008 to 2017. Total sample includes 7 215 days of stock 
repurchases which are examined as daily observations, formed into portfolios of at least 
10-days (99 events) and 15-days (63 events) of continuous buybacks and portfolio of 25-
days (63 events) of buybacks with maximum of three days without any stock 
repurchases. All event periods follow a ten-day period without any stock repurchases to 
examine the effect when quitting the buybacks. 
 
The results suggest that actual buybacks have a positive daily effect of 0,0815 % on the 
stock price, while quitting buybacks has a negative effect on the stock price. The biggest 
positive and negative effects are mainly on ten-day period around quitting the buybacks. 
Positive average abnormal returns start to cumulate in around six days before a 
company ends their stock repurchases. Negative returns start to cumulate directly after 
a company quits buybacks for around four days. Considering the main event window 
and overall effect of stock buybacks study finds to have mixing results, ten-day portfolio 
reports negative CAAR, when 15-days and 25-days portfolios report positive average 
abnormal returns with only 25-day portfolio having statistically significant results.  
 
 
KEYWORDS: Stock repurchase, Open market, Buyback program, Nasdaq 
OMX Helsinki, Event Study
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
What happens when companies acquire their own shares with an open-market 
program? This is a commonly asked question among literature and a point of interest 
for every investor. Stock buybacks have grown rapidly from 1980´s to this day, and an 
investor can see again bigger program announcements in U.S. stock market, thanks to 
the new tax reform where companies are distributing profits to shareholders. Tomperi 
(2004) described capital market reactions as shown in figure 1, with good news the 
market reacts positively and with bad news the stock price declines. To know whether 
the news is good or bad, one needs information about consequences of the new 
information. To know what happens, we trust on prior data, and it tells us that the stock 
price tends to rise when company announces a repurchase program as well as with 
buybacks, but what happens after the buybacks are done?  
 
 
 
 
Kowerski (2011) study examined the current situation and a dividend-based model 
pricing (equation 1) with companies that acquire their shares. The study argues that the 
old dividend yield ratio model should be updated into a new model that notes also the 
Figure 1. Capital market reaction to Equity cash flow decisions (Tomperi 2004.) 
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value of buybacks (equation 2), this allows an investor to get more accurate information 
about distributed cash. 
 
(1)   𝐷𝑌𝑅 =
Dividend per share
Share market price
𝑥 100 % 
 
(2)  𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =
Dividend and value of repurshased shares per 1 share
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
 𝑥 100 % 
 
Taking both dividends and stock repurchases in concern is important when pricing a 
company and evaluating what kind of cash flows it has been distributing to shareholders 
before. As figure 2 shows, an evidence from U.S. markets documents that even dividend 
yield ratio has declined during sample period of 1972 to 2000, total yield ratio has stayed 
close to 2 %. This suggests that dividend ratio is not as well functioning factor anymore 
considering payout. Using Kowerski (2011) modification of the old dividend-based 
model, investors will achieve a more realistic picture about payout. When firms are using 
more stock repurchases, it is necessary to know and understand the function of their 
effects on stock markets.  
 
Figure 2. DPR, RPR and TPR & DYR, RPR, RYR (Kowerski 2011.) 
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Overall, the subject of stock repurchases is needed for new and updated information 
about different consequences of buybacks. This study will focus on getting updated and 
new information to be used for investment opportunities. When the number of firms 
acquiring their shares has grown from 25 % to over 50 % between 1975 and 2015 (figure 
3), it gives bigger opportunity for investors in profiting from an ending buyback program. 
Investors can, for example, make assumptions when buybacks will end using dates of a 
starting quiet period or if a company has announced it will buyback shares between 
dates of X to Y or with some other way. This study will give light to if one could profit in 
their trading considering these dates.  
 
 
 
 
1.1. Purpose of the study 
 
When previous researches (Vermaelen 1981; Kahle 2001; Högholm & Höghom 2017; 
Dittmar & Field 2016; Gupta 2017; Keasler & Byerly 2015) have documented abnormal 
returns in an announcement, in post-announcement and during buybacks, as well as 
studies have documented long-term abnormal results (Yook 2010). Recently, academics 
have focused mainly on examine the abnormal returns on the above-mentioned topics. 
The purpose of this study is to examine with Finnish data the current situation 
Figure 3. Number of firms repurchasing shares 1975 - 2015 (Bonaimé et al. 2018) 
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considering the days when companies repurchase their shares and obtain new 
information about what happens directly after buybacks. Lately, there has been again a 
growth in U.S. stock markets in repurchase announcements and actual repurchases, and 
because of different regulations in Finland there is a possibility to study what happens 
during stock buybacks and directly after a company ends repurchases. This much needed 
information can be used in a bigger scale to examine different situations with bigger 
data sets that need more assumptions. For example, if study finds significant impacts 
when firms end their buybacks, similar study can be done with SP500 companies that 
have long-lasting buybacks going on making assumptions that a firm buy shares each 
day and quits just for announced quiet periods (or silent periods). To do these 
assumptions, it would be helpful for academics to know first what happens when 
examine the daily observations with country that has regulations to announce also the 
daily buybacks, as in Finland. 
 
Based on the efficient market hypothesis (Fama 1970), abnormal returns should 
disappear from markets with time, because people change their behavior regarding the 
new information. With this suggestion, companies should get abnormal returns during 
an announcement (new information), not with each day a company buyback their 
shares. This study examines also whether there are abnormal returns during the daily 
observations of buybacks, to see do investors undervalue the information considering 
buyback announcements. 
 
Considering buybacks, in Finland the laws and regulations differ from The United States. 
Because of the regulation that public companies need to announce daily repurchases in 
Finland, this allows this study to examine how returns cumulate during days when 
companies are buying back shares and days directly after buybacks. This study uses 
precise dates and examines should one act differently with a certain break or ending 
coming to buybacks. In my knowledge, this is the first study considering days directly 
after buybacks, and much-needed information considering a future analysis of S&P 500 
companies which would need much more assumptions about actual buying dates and 
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breaks. The contribution of this study and for this topic will be to get updated 
information from daily data from Finnish stock markets and new information on what 
happens when a company ends it´s buybacks. 
  
1.2. Formation of the research hypotheses 
 
This study will examine what happens during and after stock repurchase programs in 
short-term. Overall, previous research has suggested that an announcement effect and 
effects of long-term stock buyback programs gain positive abnormal returns. The 
question of short-term effects after buybacks are, however, much less examined topic 
as most countries do not have regulations to publish daily repurchases. This study will 
focus on Finnish data to measure what exactly happens in the time that a company ends 
their buybacks for one reason or another. These reasons can be for example, that a 
company has reached total dollar or volume target of buyback program or has an 
upcoming financial report announcement and have a necessary quiet period of two 
weeks to one month depending on the firm. 
 
The research hypotheses are that the daily stock buyback programs have a positive daily 
impact during the repurchases and ending stock buyback program has a negative impact 
on stock price, which will be examined with a portfolio of 10-, 15- and 25-days of 
repurchases following a 10-day period without buybacks. These hypotheses will be 
tested by an event study, to examine the exact day-to-day effects of periods of buyback 
days and after-acquisitions. The motivation for these portfolio formations is based on 
the nature of stock buybacks, even it has not been done previously in academic 
literature. However, when examining fundamentally quite similar ex-dividend days 
impact on the stock price it is often done by event studies in time frame of [-10;10], [-
20;20] or [-10;20] as in studies Dasilas (2009), Garcia-Blandon & Martinez-Blasco (2012), 
Yilmaz & Gulay (2006) and Athanassakos & Fowler (1993).  
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In the authors opinion, the portfolio formation can be motivated by the following 
characteristics of buyback programs. Firstly, considering most publicly listed companies 
announce financial data after every quarter and most of the companies in the dataset 
have quiet periods between two weeks to one month before the financial release. This 
makes maximum amount of successive repurchase days equal to two months of trading, 
about 45 days. Thus, theoretically maximum considering this study is 45 trading days. 
Because of the low amount of long-lasting stock repurchase programs in Finland, study 
is reducing the maximum portfolio to 25-days with allowance that the time period can 
have three days without buybacks.  
 
Secondly, when the dataset includes mainly maximum of 15-days of daily repurchases 
study chooses time periods of 10-days and 15-days for examine of continuous 
repurchases. In the author`s opinion, this formation should not distort results as the 
portfolios aim to answer for hypothesis two which concerns the post-buyback period. 
Even it might narrow down our number of samples, author´s opinion is that these 
portfolios do reflect the real stock buyback programs with the best way to do research 
from this new topic. 
 
Thirdly, the motivation to choose a time period of ten days when examining post-
buyback periods in each portfolio is in possible quiet period minimum of two weeks 
equaling to ten trading days as describe above.  
  
Thus, hypotheses are 
 
H1: Daily stock buyback have a positive effect on the stock price 
 
H2: Ending stock buybacks have a negative effect on the stock price 
 
The daily effect will be tested using every single buyback as an own event without 
limitations of size, volume or press releases.  
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1.3. Structure of the thesis 
 
The thesis is structured so that the first chapter is an introduction including the 
hypotheses and motivation for the study. The second chapter is an overview about what 
the previous literature tells us about stock buybacks, including methods of stock 
buybacks and reasons behind repurchases as well as the effects of repurchases based 
on previous literature and laws and regulations in Finland.  
 
The third chapter will disclose the data used for this study and methodology of the study. 
The fourth chapter is focusing on the results reveled with our unique daily data and sixth 
chapter is concluding the thesis.   
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW ON THE PROGRAMMES & THE REGULATIONS 
 
 
This chapter will give an overview of stock buy-back programs in the global aspect, 
focusing on studies from US markets. First study will discuss about the different methods 
for stock repurchases and after that the reasons behind buyback programs. The third 
subchapter will include laws and regulations in Finland as it is one of the main 
motivations to use Finnish data for study.  
 
 
2.1. Methods for share repurchase programs  
 
After companies have chosen to use stock repurchases, they need to choose which one 
of the stock buyback program type fits best to their targets. There are three well-known 
and some less studied ways to complete the wanted repurchases. Those are overall 
mostly used open market program, less commonly used fixed-price tender offer and 
rarely used Dutch auction (Grullon & Ikenberry 2000; Stonham 2002). Fourth possibility 
is a less studied form, negotiating sales by selected investors (Kowerski 2011). The US 
markets started using stock repurchase programs more in the mid-1980s, even both 
open markets repurchase and tender-offers have been available in the US markets for 
decades (Grullon et al. 2000.) Because of the rare use of Dutch auctions as a repurchase 
method, some studies, such as Oded (2011) and Stonham (2002), has excluded the 
Dutch actions out of their studies.  
 
Based on study from Grullon et al. (2000) open market programs have been significantly 
most used method in the period of 1980 to 1999 in US markets. The study suggests that 
overall open market programs cover 91 % of the total value of repurchase 
announcements being on the highest in 1995 when covering 98 % of all buy-back 
announcements. 
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Table 1. Buyback programs and the values 80-99 (Grullon et al. 2000.) 
 
 
As can be seen from table 1, open market programs have grown almost a-hundred-fold 
times in value when the program count has grown fifteen-fold. As can be inferred, the 
value of programs has also grown significantly in the period. The value of repurchases is 
still rising, Ossinger & Popina (2018) wrote in a Bloomberg article that the new estimates 
for total value of US buybacks is expected to be as much as $800 billion in 2018, thanks 
to the tax-cut from President Donald Trump. So, even the value has risen significantly in 
19-years period, it looks like the biggest boom in the total value of buyback programs 
has slightly cooled within the -00´s tech bubble and -08´s financial crisis. 
    Dutch auction tender offer              Fixed tender offer                   Open market programs
Year Programs Worth (mil.) Programs Worth (mil.) Programs Worth (mil.)
1980 0 0 1 5 86 1,429
1981 0 0 44 1,329 95 3,013
1982 0 0 40 1,164 129 3,112
1983 0 0 40 1,352 53 2,278
1984 1 9 67 10,571 236 14,91
1985 6 1,123 36 13,352 159 22,786
1986 11 2,332 20 5,492 219 28,417
1987 9 1,502 42 4,764 132 34,787
1988 21 7,695 32 3,826 276 33,15
1989 22 5,044 49 1,939 499 62,873
1990 10 1,933 41 3,463 778 39,733
1991 4 739 51 4,715 282 16,139
1992 7 1,638 37 1,488 447 32,635
1993 5 1,291 51 1,094 461 35
1994 10 925 52 2,796 824 71,036
1995 8 969 40 542 851 81,591
1996 22 2,774 37 2,562 1,111 157,917
1997 30 5,442 35 2,552 967 163,688
1998 20 2,64 13 4,364 1,537 215,012
1999 19 3,817 21 1,79 1,212 137,015
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Table 2. Total buybacks 99-18 (Ossinger & Popina 2018.) 
 
 
After financial crisis cooled down, based on figures by J.P. Morgan in table 2, the total 
amount of S&P 500 companies repurchase programs have settled down in about $500 
billion annually. Interestingly, value of announced and executed stock repurchases are 
not significantly different, which means that companies that announce programs often 
also go through with the buybacks. The study will next describe the three types of stock 
buy-backs, focusing on the most common one, open market programs.  
 
 
2.1.1. Open market program 
 
As told before, open market (or on-market) programs are so far the most common way 
for companies to acquire their own shares from the market. The reason why open 
market programs are so widely used, is the reason of quite flexible compared to the two 
others. The flexibility comes from when a company chooses to announce a share 
buyback program, there are usually still some questions for the management to sort out, 
such as what will be the exact amount of money to spend for share acquisitions. After 
announcement companies can still choose whether to repurchase the shares, or for how 
much. Open market programs are also flexible over time, and companies can choose a 
19 
 
period that suits their needs the best, such as seeing the stock as undervalued and by 
this maximize the long-term shareholder value (Ikenberry et al. 1996). In US markets, 
size or duration, nor threading is a limited factor with buyback programs as can be 
witnessed with Apple Inc.´s $210 billion repurchase program threaded in 2013 to 2017 
after adding again $100 billion in the program in 2018 (Weinberger 2017; Fingas 2018). 
However, it has been proven that the normal size of open market programs is about five 
percent of total shares (Grullon et al. 2000.) 
 
When a company chooses to implement the transactions, it usually authorizes a bank to 
acquire shares worth a certain amount in a certain timeline. After the shares are bought, 
they are either deleted or kept by the company to be given for stock option programs.  
Stonham (2002) study describes situations when firms typically choose to use open 
market programs over tender offers as: 
 
“Managers prefer open-market repurchases when markets are 
turbulent, their firms do not have financial slack (e.g. 
excess cash flow), and are highly leveraged (and 
therefore find external financing expensive). Such 
firms will tend to be larger, more heavily analysed, 
and therefore are less likely to be undervalued by the 
stock market.” 
 
Stonham (2002) study explains also that one of the problems with long lasting open 
market programs can be that these programs usually do not draw out the unwanted 
investors. Rather, the reverse effect happens.  
 
Stephens & Weisbach (1998) studied the actual repurchases against announcements of 
buybacks and based on their data of 450 programs between 1981 to 1990 companies 
used the flexibility of open market programs well. Firms acquired average of 74 to 85 
percent of the total amount of the announced shares. The percent of actual repurchases 
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varies between firms, as study suggests that 57 % of the firms bought at least that 
amount of shares they originally announced for within 3 years when only 10 % bought 
less than 5 %. Research states that the substantial number of companies did not actually 
buy a single share because of unknown reasons. So, based on the study, one might say 
the announcements either lead to buying all the shares or none of the shares.  
 
2.1.2. Fixed-price tender offer 
 
Grullon et al. (2000) defines fixed-price tender offer as it is named, firm giving a specified 
price to all shareholders to tender their shares for. Study describes that the offer is 
usually valid for a limited period and can contain a minimum and maximum number of 
shares for shareholders to tender and for company to buy. When the amount of offered 
shares exceeds the amount that company has announced to buy, management has the 
option to choose whether to buy all the shares or just the announced amount. In cases 
where the company chooses to buy only the announced shares, investors will receive 
back over-offered shares. 
 
Fixed-price tender offers are a great way to buy a block of shares in a short period of 
time and are used in cases when the management wants to send a clear message for 
undervalued stock price (Grullon et al. 2000). Stonham (2002) study describes situations 
when company typically chooses fixed-price tender offer over open-market program as:  
 
“Managers are motivated to choose tender offers  
when their firms have comparatively high cash flows, 
poor investment opportunities, large shareholder 
stakes, high dividend yields and greater volatility of 
returns. Such firms are likely to be small.” 
 
Study by Grullon et al. (2000) notes that typical tender offers are on average 15 % of 
total shares, so as told before, one of the motives is the opportunity to buy a block of 
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shares in a fast timetable compared to open market programs. In the same time, it is 
told that tender offers give a dramatic change considering company´s capital structure 
and usually per share valuation. Valuation changes because company usually tries to 
give a signal that their firm is undervalued and pays a premium when buying back the 
shares and investors believe that the management knows the real value better. 
 
Studies also provide data for undervaluation hypothesis especially with tender offers. 
There is a research that as much as 74 % of the firms that buyback the shares via fixed-
price tender offers are in fact undervalued based on economic value (EV). Study also 
provide a suggestion that the management is usually quite conservative when setting 
the premium and it is highly correlated with the magnitude of undervaluation. D´mello 
& Shroff (2000) study uses the residual income model (RIM) when estimating economic 
value for companies. 
 
(3)     EVt = Bt + (1 + r) Et [Xt+i - r * Bt+j-1], 
 
Where Bt stands for book value in time t and Xt earnings for time t, r stands for cost of 
equity capital what can be calculated with the CAPM model; 
 
(4)     E(r) = rf + BA[E(rm) - rf] 
 
The study also provides data that the undervaluation hypothesis does not always fit, as 
the model shows results of overvalued firms using tender offers as buyback method as 
well. These cases are usually motivated by some other purpose such as one of the 
reasons behind buy-backs described later in this study.  
 
Study by Comment & Jarrell (1991) explains that the undervaluation is based on the 
company perspective and the management is not thought to take part for analyzing the 
stock market undervaluation situations, even study from Gu & Schinski (2003) argues 
that in cases with bigger scale catastrophes, such as 9/11 or market crash in 1987 
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companies announced repurchase programs to reassure the markets. Total amount of 
US announced buybacks in 9/11 was $12,1 billion and in market crash $9,3 billion 
dollars. 
 
Study by Karhunen (2001) focused in answering a question about who the tendering 
part is while companies are using tender offer as buyback method with a dataset from 
Finnish stock markets. Results suggest that even literature explains that tender offers 
do not draw out unwanted investors, some variables are related to knowing the 
tendering part. While private investors do not realize losses as likely as institutional 
investors, capital gains taxes affect whether one will tender their shares.  Thus, with 
private investors most likely investor that will be tendering will be an investor who is 
taking profits (i.e. stocks that have risen) and it is recognized that households tend to 
tender rather older stock than newer. Households, however, will be optimizing their 
capital gains taxes in end of the year, mainly in December, so they will be more likely to 
tender shares with losses. Households are also more likely to tender in the age of 
retirement, suggesting that investors are cashing out positions in that point of time. 
Institutional owners tend to tender newer shares which can be explained by speculative 
buy before buyback announcements. Study also notes that in Finnish markets the 
highest number of shares is bought back at end of the year, September to November, 
which might be reasoned by companies trying to pull out small investors and obtain 
institutional owners. Interestingly, lowest number of buybacks being in March to May, 
which one can assume to be because of the most firms hold annual meetings in that 
time. Companies might want to postpone buybacks after revealing financials to meet 
their targets.  
 
2.1.3. Dutch auction tender offer and other rarely used methods 
 
The Dutch auction tender offer is quite the same as fixed-price tender offer, so they are 
often referred as one and the same. Despite of the similarity of tender offering, the 
process goes differently. Dutch auction started in the Dutch flowers markets when 
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aiming to get as high price as possible and is used reverse way when repurchasing 
shares. Based on Bagwell (1992) Dutch auction became as one of the buyback methods 
when Todd Shipyards planned to perform a Dutch auction where they tender 200 000 
to 550 000 shares from 5 500 000 shares with a price that do not exceed $28. Todd 
Shipyards made a deal with Bear Stearns to be paid as a fee 30 % of the total savings if 
shares were bought with less than $28. To maximize their commission, Bearn Stearns 
developed Dutch Auction to use with stock buybacks as well.  
 
The companies chose to implement first Dutch auction repurchase where investors 
chose the amount they offered and for what price. For an example, a case as described 
in Bagwell (1992), is shown in figure 1 to demonstrate the idea of a Dutch auction. 
Investors have offered their shares with the price that they see suitable, and the 
company is buying the wanted number of shares with as low price as possible. All 
investors will get anyways the highest paid price, as SEC requires under 
nondiscrimination or “best-price provision” regulations (Bagwell 1992.) 
 
 
Study suggests that the average price is 13,4 % higher than market price using Dutch 
auctions, and the companies are buying between 18,03 to 20,07 % of the total shares. 
As told before, one of the main purposes to use tender offers are that they are fast to 
Figure 4. Example for Dutch auction case like Todd Shipyards 
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implement. The mean duration for whole offer is only 22 business days based on 
research. (Bagwell 1992) 
 
Grullon et al. (2000) combines Dutch auction and fixed-price tender offer both as fixed-
price deal, the price is just given differently. Where in fixed-price tender offers the 
management is giving the price, investors have the possibility to affect into the price in 
Dutch auction. The study sums that Dutch auction is a great method especially for 
companies who want to buyback a large block of shares as cheap as possible paying less 
of a premium in the process. Thus, it can be said that the Dutch auction is greater for 
long-term shareholder value, but fixed-price tender offers tend to close the cap if 
markets have undervalued stock from managements perspective.  
 
The most unknown ways to repurchase the shares are by negotiating sales by selected 
investors, done off-the-market, open the counter repurchases or privately negotiated 
repurchases as describe in Kowerski (2011) research. These forms, however, have been 
typically ignored by the researchers as they are illegal in most countries, besides US, 
explained by the study.  
 
 
2.2. Reasons for share repurchase programs 
 
The popularity of stock repurchase programs has risen wildly since the early-1970s. 
When studies have documented that from 1972 to 1983 the total amount of 
repurchases was less than 4,5 % of total earnings, it rose to 25 % in period between 1984 
to 1998 (Grullon et al. 2000.) Grullon & Michaely (2002) documented that share 
repurchases programs increased into 41,8 % of total earnings in 2000.  
 
Firms typically announce a reason why they are using repurchases, such as excess 
capital, getting optimal capital structure, undervaluation, compensation of shareholder 
or management, EPS bump, defense against hostile takeover, or other (Grullon et al. 
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2000; Dittmar 2000; Sinha 1991.) However, these reasons do not give the whole truth. 
The factor of tax advantage of share repurchases is well documented in literature 
(Grullon et al 2000; Grullon et al. 2002), even most companies do not use it as an 
announced reason when starting a buyback program. This factor, however, is not the 
main reason when publishing repurchase programs based on Dittmar (2000). Research 
shows the results when capital gains taxes has been changing from 35 % - 28 % - 20 %, 
28 % to 20 %, in periods of prior to 1978, after 1978, after 1981, after 1986 and after 
1997, respectively. As the changes suggest if the repurchases would be dependent on 
capital gains taxes, buybacks should show these changes, which they do not. Also, it can 
be argued that stock buybacks have become quite common in Finland based on this 
study, even tax profits of buybacks are gone in Finland because investors can reduce 
losses and dividends from capital gains. In Finland, dividends are taxed by 85/15 
regulation which means that 15 % of dividends are tax free, when capital gains are 
taxable overall. This should lead to a situation where companies prefer dividends over 
buybacks, which has not happened as will be seen later in this study. (Finlex 1.)  
 
Study by Karhunen (2002) examined the announced reasons of buybacks in Finnish stock 
market from 1998 to November 2001 and notes that firms might point out more than 
just one reason for the repurchases. As shown in figure 5, “acquisition or other 
investments” is counting for 85 % of all buybacks, still most have at least one other 
reason mentioned. Interestingly, only 10 % of firms mention undervaluation as a reason 
even it is one of the most studied factors among academic literature when also 
improving capital structure counts for 55 % of announcements, but excess capital only 
15 % which one could argue that are somehow more closely connected to each other.  
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Figure 5. Announced reasons for repurchasing programs (Karhunen 2002: 92) 
 
 
This chapter will now explain the most common reasons in announced buyback 
programs and data that has already been provided by the academic literature. A 
company is usually using the announcements to signal for one or more of the situations. 
  
2.2.1. Excess capital, optimal capital structure & signaling 
 
Study by Eisenhardt (1989) defined something called the agency problem. When most 
companies have divided ownership and management, there might be problems with 
having excess capital. Based on the study, management might benefit from the excess 
cash and neglect the rights of shareholders. These situations can be avoided by 
distributing the excess capital back to shareholders with buyback programs or dividends. 
Especially in situations where there is a lack of investment opportunities, to avoid 
agency problems shareholders usually want to see excess capital distributed to them. 
On the other hand, Modgiglian and Miller (1958) presents a theory that it does not 
matter how company distributes the cash if taxes and other are taken as constant. 
85%
55%
21%
15%
10%
3%
32%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
Acquisition or
other
investments
Improve capital
stucture
Incentive
programs
Excess cash Undervaluation Not disclosed Other
Announced reasons in Finland 1998 - 30/11/2001
27 
 
Because this is not the case in real world, companies might prefer repurchases over 
dividends when it is more tax-efficient.  
 
Study by Bradley, Jarrel & Kim (1984) defines the math behind an optimal capital 
structure. When talking about capital structure, the question is how much a company 
should have equity and how much debt when considering variables. Ratio can be 
somewhere near 40 %, depending on firm-specific and industry-specific characteristics. 
 
Considering the leverage-related costs, such as agency costs, bankruptcy costs and the 
cost of tax shields and if equity income is untaxed it will lead into a positive tax 
advantage if the bondholders tax rate is less than corporates. Agency costs and 
bankruptcy costs rise in financial distress, so they can be counted as costs of financial 
distress. In short, based on Bradley et al. (1984) a company should issue debt if the cost 
to bondholders, Tpb, is less than firms constant marginal tax rate, Tc: 
 
(5)    𝑡𝑐 − 𝑡𝑝𝑏 =
𝑡𝑐[𝐹(?̂?+𝜙∕𝑡𝑐)−𝐹(?̂?)]+(1−𝑡𝑝𝑏)𝑘?̂?𝑓(?̂?)
[1−𝐹(?̂?)]
 
Where,  𝑡𝑐  = firms constant marginal tax rate 
𝑡𝑝𝑏 = return of the bonds to investors 
F(x) = cumulative probability density of function 
Y = Total end-of-period promised to bondholders 
𝜙 = total after-tax value of non-debt shields if they are fully used at the end-of-period 
𝑘 = costs of financial distress per dollar of end-of-period value of the firm 
?̂?𝑓 = probability of the density of Y 
 
 
Overall, Bradley et al. (1984) study finds that there are inverse relationships between 
leverage and costs of financial distress, as also with non-debt tax shields and variability 
of firm earnings. Notable, factors such industry-wide volatility in earnings, R&D costs 
and advertising costs affect also to the optimal capital structure.  
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When repurchases are used in real markets, they can be used to signal investors about 
positive future. When excess capital can be seen from the financial statements and 
optimal capital structure can be calculated, one might assume that the strongest 
signaling effect will reflect the future cash flows. When the efficient market hypothesis 
(Fama 1970) has been proven as an ideal idea of the markets, the management might 
have more inside knowledge about future cash flows than investors and wants cash 
flows priced into the stock. This information asymmetry, difference between instinct 
and market values, can be caught up with a press release of repurchase program. 
Grullon et al. (2000) study describes that if announcing just the new positive overlook of 
future, managements view can be more easily ignored until the numbers arrive. 
However, in cases where the information asymmetry of future cash flows will be tried 
to be removed by repurchase programs results are mixed. When early studies found 
modest growth, data from 1980 to 1994 does not (Grullon et al. 2000.) In the data 
period, it is been proven decline in operating income which might lead to another reason 
of repurchase programs, aiming for an increase in earnings per share, or in this case 
keeping the level that company operates in.  
 
When the studies have documented repurchase announcements usually as a positive 
signal about future, there are also known situations when managers might try to use 
this as “cheap talk” to achieve abnormal return. With the characteristics of open market 
programs, managers are using the flexibility to announce the programs without any plan 
to pursuit with it and might use it as a tool to boost the stock price. Markets, however, 
remember the past track record and this tool is not useful for a long time. Chan, 
Ikenberry, Lee & Wang (2010) have reported that firms with low earnings quality do 
enjoy a small benefit in short-term but in long term the abnormal returns disappear. 
Chang, Chen & Chen, however, reported that when the markets do remember past track 
record firms with a strong past with announcements and signaling future cash flows will 
get more positive welcome from markets. One reason for the management to give a 
false signal is reasoned by option-based salary system together with aiming to fulfil their 
EPS-target.  
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2.2.2. Undervaluation 
 
When the future cash flows are known and information about future is well-enough told, 
value of a company should be easily calculated and be worth as much as the dividends 
will sum when discounted to present value. Dividend discount model (DDM), by Farrel 
(1985), gives an easy, and quick way to calculate the expected value of future cash flows 
with: 
 
(6)    𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦 =
Dividend
Discount rate − expected growth
   
 
Where the discount rate is collective effect of the risk-free return and risk premium. 
Even investors have different expectations and risk premiums, DDM will supply a quick 
check about the expected value of a company.  
 
When the company is undervalued based on management opinion and calculations, it 
should be caught up to maximize the long-term shareholder value. Study by D´mello et 
al. (2000) examines whether companies repurchase stock when they are undervalued 
using the difference in instinct and market values. Study finds that 74 percent of firms 
that are repurchasing are undervalued, compared to 51 percent with control sample of 
non-repurchasing firms. Study describes that companies trying to signal undervaluation 
used tender offers and buy stock using conservative premiums. Used premiums, 
however, are highly correlated with the magnitude of undervaluation and as described 
earlier, the biggest effect is given when tender program is used by small firms. 
 
When Dittmar (2000) study examines the undervaluation hypothesis, study comes with 
a conclusion that usually the undervaluation is not the only reason behind the 
repurchases. Based on the study, firms tend to consider multiple reasons when choosing 
whether to implement stock buybacks. Research has shown that when tender offers are 
a good way to signal about undervaluation, open market programs are not. Ikenberry, 
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Lakonishok & Vermaelen (1995) study describes that there is larger effect with tender 
offers compared to open market programs, 12,1 % abnormal returns in next four-year 
period after open market program announcement with buy-and-hold strategy. This 
demonstrates that markets do not catch up the price even when program 
announcement are trying to signal about the information asymmetry.  
 
With a data sample of 2004 to 2011 from US markets, study by Dittmar (2016) describes 
that companies that are infrequent buyers achieved abnormal return of 0,6 % per month 
over three months period and buyers 0,3 % per month over 36 months period when 
repurchasing stock over frequent buyers.  Study describes that especially companies 
that buy shares infrequently have been better timing the markets than more frequently 
buying firms. 
 
Study by Dittmar (2016) also documents that the firms that have announced 
undervalued as major reason behind a stock buyback program achieves bigger CAR in 
next three-day period compared to those who states as some different reason. Study 
shows that undervalued firms achieve CAR of 2.09 % when control group has 1.67 % 
cumulative abnormal return. 
 
2.2.3. Compensation for shareholders and management 
 
When investors are buying shares, they expect to be compensated for their investment. 
The traditional dividend-based model needs an update for some firms, that do not pay 
much dividends but compensates it´s shareholders using stock buyback programs. When 
compensating investors with dividends, it is done usually only one to four times a year, 
while with repurchases the amount is about 200, if considering the amount of trading 
days included in a year minus silent periods. By open market programs companies can 
compensate the shareholders every day they repurchase shares postponing the taxes to 
a shareholder friendly time for the long-term shareholders. This of course is seen as a 
great deal for many shareholders.  
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While the total value of dividends has reduced in US markets in the same time with the 
popularity growth with buybacks there are still use for both. Study by Guay & Harford 
(1999) have examined whether the origin of cash flows have an effect into the 
compensation style and with a conclusion of them to give different signals. Based on the 
study, companies aim in a slow-growing stable dividend and short-term excess cash 
flows to be distributed mostly by repurchases. While companies announce a repurchase 
program, they are signaling about short-term positive effects on the cash flows, and 
investors might take this as a sign about flat or negative expectations. While most 
managers are aiming to have a slow-growing dividend with announcements of using 
long-term excess cash flows in dividend growth, markets take it as a signal about positive 
long-term overview.   
 
Dittmar (2000) notes that markets usually calculate the total tax efficiency for different 
compensation styles. In countries where losses on sales can be reduced from profits but 
not from dividend income, investors prefer more the repurchase based compensation. 
Even calculating a positive effect of repurchase tax-efficiency, one might argue that 
companies do not calculate it as a reason for different distribution. Dittmar (2000) study 
suggest that with firms which use buyback programs also to distribute the profits, 
dividend yields do not differ from comparison group. Thus, repurchases can be thought 
as a complementary part for compensating shareholders with excess short-term cash 
flows. This analyze can be thought also from Grullon et al. (2000) study, which describes 
that special dividends, occasional payments, as a compensation form has reduced 
dramatically in the same time as repurchase programs popularity has grown. Study by 
Kahle (2002) describes that even there is no evidence that repurchases have replaced 
special dividends, even in 1995 only 1,4 % of NYSE firms payed them – in the same time 
with rising the repurchasing programs. 
 
Research from Kahle (2002) discusses matter when the buyback is not meant to be as 
the normal buyback programs compensating shareholders. Study describes that one of 
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the reasons behind an exponential increase in repurchase programs is because of the 
changes in payout policies. When companies compensate their management or other 
employees, stock options are getting more common since the very early 90´s. Early study 
from Kahle (2002) shows that in 1992 total value of stock options and grants were just 
$8.9 billion, the value grew to $45,6 billion for year 1997. However, recent studies have 
argued against the options and their effect for long-term shareholder value, which has 
led to declining option-based compensation. Study by Bonaimé, Kahle, Moore & Nemani 
(2018) shows with a hand-collected data from 1994 to 2012 that option grants grow 1,81 
% of total shares outstanding in 1994, peak in 2000 to 2,99 %, before falling to 0,64 % in 
2012. In the same time repurchases almost triple from 1% of total market capitalization 
to 2,8 %.  
 
 
Figure 6. Option grants and restricted stocks from (Bonaimé et al. 2018) 
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Thus, shown in figure 6, the option grants have been declining significantly since the top 
year of 2000, when stock repurchase programs have been following global economic 
situation as shown below in figure 8 (Liu et al. 2016). This leads into a conclusion that 
companies do not announce the buybacks just for completing granted option programs. 
Even the evidence does not show relationship with options and repurchases, one might 
argue that management would enjoy the possibility of abnormal returns when their 
compensation is based more on compensating with options than in salary-based payout 
method.  
 
Figure 7. Change in repurchase and dividend yields (Bonaimé et al. 2018.) 
Figure 8. Share repurchases and S&P 500 index 03-14 (Liu et al. 2016.) 
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Dittmar (2000) study has described that one of the reasons could be that even 
management do not necessarily announce repurchase to pay options, they do it to 
distribute cash to shareholders without diluting per-share value. This will lead to 
increasing value of stock options, when dividends do decrease the value of both stock 
and options. 
 
2.2.4. Increasing earnings per share 
 
Earnings per share (EPS) is one of the most used tools when valuing a stock. Price of a 
share can be calculated by dividing total earnings with the number of shares and 
multiplying it with the target payback period, for example, 15 years. 
 
(7)    𝐸𝑃𝑆 =
Total Earnigns
Shares
 
 
When firms repurchase shares, the number of shares is declining, and EPS increases with 
total earnings. When earlier studies have documented significant increase in EPS 
following fixed-price tender offers, Grullon & Michaelly (2004) shows that analysts 
review their forecasts downwards during the month of share buyback announcement. 
Study shows also evidence that programs above median will receive bigger downward 
in forecasts. Overall, there is no proof for improvements in the actual EPS nor there is in 
profitability or operating performance. So, one of the reasons behind the wanted “EPS-
Bump” could be that management does not want declining figures of profitability and 
tries to fix the future problems with repurchases. 
 
Study by Liu & Swanson (2016) has also tested the profitability of firms in time of 
repurchases. Study finds that companies have decline in return on assets (ROA), when 
EPS decline is modest thanks to the repurchases. Thus, firms are trying to support the 
stock price with repurchasing and trying to keep stock overvalued, and not necessarily 
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tries to signal for undervaluation mentioned earlier. This might be reasoned by 
managers paycheck being linked in success of EPS-targets. 
 
 
 
 
As figure 9 shows, ROA decreases significantly, when debt liquidity and EPS have modest 
changes. When examine (figure 10) the changes in returns, repurchases, short interest 
and abnormal returns evidence shows that companies try to avoid the effect of 
increasing short interest. While analysists find decreasing raw returns, there’s increase 
in short interest, which leads to repurchase programs and short-time abnormal returns. 
 
 
Figure 9. Operating performance around share repurchases (Liu et al. 2016.) 
Figure 10. Effects of repurchases by quarters (Liu et al 2016.) 
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2.2.5. Takeover defense & other minor announced reasons 
 
After describing the most common reasons what companies have used when publishing 
a stock repurchase programs, study will go through the less used but still well-known 
reasons for buybacks among academic literature. This will include takeover defense and 
some other reported reasons and effects of these announcements. Being in history as 
one of common reason, study will first describe takeover defense. When companies are 
undervalued or/and have some invention with a payout profile one might try to acquire 
it before market reacts enough. In these situations, one might try first with a public offer 
to buy all the current shares by giving a tender offer announcement. If board of directors 
sees an undervaluation, it might try to block the offer first by announcing they do not 
recommend that shareholders sell shares. Even after this, when a company is publicly 
traded one might try to start buying all the available shares from the market to achieve 
a position as big as possible in the company to acquire rest. Dittmar (2000) study 
describes a situation where some of the shareholders might want to take part for the 
tender offer, and the company is trying to block buyer for getting too big part from the 
company. Shareholders who settle for smaller premium are selling the shares for tender 
price or higher, when others do not. By publishing a repurchase program when the 
takeover attempt is going, firm will increase the cost of acquisition because of an 
upward-sloping supply curve. The company will be buying the lower-end from market 
price to acquisition price and raises the amount that needs to be paid for wanted market 
share, e.g. 15 %. Based on Dittmar (2000) study, repurchase programs were extra 
popular in 80´s when there were many hostile takeover attempts in US market.  
 
Billett & Xue (2007) study analyses that even open market programs do not affect as 
well against takeover attempts as fixed-price tender offers, both are useful in protecting 
against one. For example, Bagwell (1991) study describes a situation where a company 
bought back 10 % of shares to avoid a takeover with a great success.  Takeover attempts 
can be also avoided by reverse way. An early study by Sinha (1991) examines that when 
companies are in the radar to be bought, capital structure will be analyzed carefully. As 
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this study described there is an optimal capital structure for firms, and by repurchasing 
shares with debt, it will make the company riskier and thus avoid for a possible hostile 
takeover attempt. 
 
Also, as mentioned earlier, in crisis companies announce repurchase programs. Gu et al. 
(2003) study examines how announced buybacks after 9/11 terrorist attack affected the 
stock markets and abnormal return. Study finds that announcements in following two 
weeks of attack were to stabilize the markets and had a positive effect on the stock 
price. This is explained by “patriotism effect”, as most of the companies that announced 
buybacks were thought as trying to stabilize the markets and rewarded by patriotic 
investors. The patriotism can be explained by stock market officials, the government and 
SEC encouragement for companies to acquire shares to stabilize the market. As 
mentioned earlier, similar situation was with 1987 stock market crash. The results for 
9/11 gave positive effects, even in 1987 when companies also announced repurchase 
programs, they did not follow through them and investors had reasons to be skeptical 
for announcements. Reasons behind investors´ optimism in announcements might be 
because of the decline in stock value, and thoughts that management sees it as 
undervalued (Gu et al. 2003.)  
 
Firms may also want to add liquidity for a stock when there in a nonliquid market to 
make the share more desirable for investors. Based on the asymmetric information 
hypothesis, when companies buy back their own share there might be a problem with 
information, as management is thought to withhold better information as outsiders. 
Tomperi (2004) study examines with Finnish data how have stock repurchase 
announcements and actual buybacks affected to firms’ market liquidity. Tomperi (2004) 
uses a bid-ask spread to determinate the effects of repurchases, as well as the volume 
of repurchases.  
 
(8)     SPREAD% =
(Ask−𝐵𝑖𝑑)
[(Ask + Bid) / 2]
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Results are in line with earlier studies and indicate that small-cap firms bid-ask spreads 
decreases, and volume increases both after an announcement and after actual 
repurchases when large companies´ bid-ask spread keeps unchanged with an increase 
in trading volume. Results show that if a firm desire to increase the volume of changed 
stock, it should announce a repurchase program to do that. An increased trading volume 
might add value of a company when markets are afraid of a situation where they need 
to get rid of it in the future. Other point of view is also presented by Hillert, Maug & 
Obernberger (2016), which examines data in US markets with findings that even 
companies provide liquidity in times of crisis when there is a lot of selling-side, 
companies also want to reduce transaction costs by buying back shares when the 
liquidity is high. This way firms provide both price support and liquidity in times of crisis. 
 
However, taking maximizing shareholder´s long-term wealth into account, study by Nain 
& Vijh (2016) has examined whether companies do provide misleading earnings 
guidance before buybacks to have the change of buying back shares cheaper. Even it 
would maximize the long-term value of shareholder´s wealth, study finds no evidence 
of such a behavior. 
 
 
2.3. Laws and regulations in Finland 
 
Laws for stock repurchases are based on Finnish Limited Liability Companies Act, chapter 
15, 5 § (Finlex 2). Companies can purchase their own shares with a decision by general 
meeting and are obligated to inform an investor about maximum number of shares for 
each class of shares to be bought, validity of the authorization and minimum and 
maximum price considering repurchases. A general meeting can authorize a board of 
directors to choose whether to implement actual repurchases and if so, in which size. 
Once a General meeting has given the authorization it can be valid for a maximum of 18 
months, and because of this, some companies, like Nokia Oyj, will usually give a 
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repurchase authorization every year in their general meeting, which may or may not be 
used. There are also restrictions that own shares can only be bought using free equity.  
 
Laws for informing investors about every day’s stock repurchases are based on the 
Securities Markets Act chapter 8, 2 §. The Securities Markets Act allows the managing 
director of the exchange, in this case director of Nasdaq Helsinki, to give a guideline on 
the transactions of either acquisition or selling firms own shares. (Finlex 3) As a 
supplement, also Nasdaq Helsinki rules require Finnish listed companies to publish a 
release every day before the next exchange date considering done stock repurchases 
(Nasdaq Helsinki rules 2018)  
 
European union delegated settings of the commission (2016/1052) which takes into 
concern prevent market abuse article (MAR article 5), has a code considering stock 
repurchases. Regulations impose that a price of a buyback cannot be higher than either 
the highest last nonpartisan trade nor higher than the highest bid on the market place. 
Thus, it can be said that a company is not allowed to boost their stock price using 
repurchases. Also, MAR 5 article requires that a firm is not allowed to acquire more than 
25 % of the average daily volume based on either a) average volume of previous month, 
which needs to be defined in the publication considering repurchases or b) an average 
volume of previous 20 trading days before the actual repurchase day. (The official 
journal of European Union (OJ) 
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3. LITERATURE REVIEW ON THE IMPACT OF STOCK REPURCHASES 
 
 
As discussed in the introduction, based on the efficient market hypothesis the abnormal 
returns in stock buybacks should have disappeared in time with research getting more 
known in them. Some studies have mentioned this also happen, such as a [study by Fu 
& Huang (2015) cited in] Manconi et al. (2018). When early studies show significant 
abnormal returns with announcement, reasonable question would be if the results have 
changed in time. Study will now go through first the earlier research, following with 
more resent results to show what have academic literature proven in the years trying to 
seek if there have been movement with abnormal returns. 
 
Karhunen (2002) reviewed the main studies of announcement effects within 3-day 
period of an announcement and concluded a table to see different results between the 
early 70´s before the boom of buyback programs until 1996. As can be seen from table 
3, the announcement effect has reduced in both tender offer and open market programs 
when rarer Dutch auction has been in quite stable 8 %.  The study also examines tender 
offers in Finnish stock markets between 1994 and 2000, which includes total of 23 offers. 
Based on the results, in Finnish markets an average premium (in this case, average 
return over 30 days from the announcement) is 27 % with a median of 14 %. A research 
made in the U.S. stock markets shows similar results, even there can be seen a declining 
effect from 17.0 % to 7,9 % (Masulis 1980; Lie et al. 1998). More recent study by Yook 
(2010) finds statistically significant abnormal return of 6.27 % considering 
announcements with tender offers, when with open market announcements study finds 
not to be statistically significant, which can be taken as a surprise compared to other 
academic research. Tender offers tend to outperform open market programs also in 
event windows of 1 to 12, 1 to 24 and 1 to 36 months. In each time period, study finds 
tender offers to achieve about 0,20 % better abnormal returns compared to open 
market programs. Thus, it can be said that abnormal returns have not disappeared, but 
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it is safe to say that they have declined significantly from the early study by Masulis 
(1980) reporting announcement effect of 17.0 %.  
 
 
Table 3. Announcement effect within 3-day period (Karhunen 2002: 8.) 
Repurchase 
 method Study 
Sample 
 Period 
Sample 
 Size 
Announcement 
 effect 
Tender Offer Masulis (1980) 1963 – 78 199 17.0 % 
 Dann (1981) 1962 – 76 122 15.4 % 
 
Lakonishok & Vermaelen 
(1990) 1962 – 86 221 12.5 % 
 Lie & McConnell (1998) 1981 – 94 116 7.9 % 
     
Dutch auction Comment & Jarrell (1991) 1984 – 88 72 8.0 % 
 Bagwell (1992) 1981 – 88 31 7.7 % 
 Lie & McConnell (1998) 1981 – 94 91 7.7 % 
     
Open Market Vermaelen (1981) 1970 – 78 243 3.7 % 
 Ikenberry et al. (1995) 1980 – 90 1239 3.5 % 
 
Stephensen & Weisbach 
(1998) 1981 – 90 994 2.7 % 
 Guay & Hartford (2000) 1981 – 93 1062 2.1 % 
 Ikenberry et al. (2000) 1989 – 97 1080 0.9 % 
 Kahle (2001) 1993 – 96 712 1.6 % 
 
 
A more recent study (Högholm et al. 2017) considering abnormal returns in Finland in 
open market programs has also documented significant returns within announcement. 
Study uses event study and announcement day to examine the effects of open market 
programs in time period of -2 to +2 and found abnormal return of 1.51 %. Based on the 
study, biggest effect is on the announcement day, + 2% abnormal return. Study also 
notes that average number of days that company repurchases shares in Finland after 
buyback announcement is 42 days with a median of 27 days. Author´s opinion is that 
this gives confirmation for our hypothesis formation, where longest analyzed period is 
25 days of stock buybacks.  Högholm et al. (2007) study also calculates CAAR around the 
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first actual repurchase in time period of -20 to +20 as figure 11 illustrates. Study finds a 
strong positive effect on the first day of repurchase and as stated in the study, results 
are in line with undervaluation hypothesis. Study also notes that positive effect may be 
driven because of increased demand and not only because of undervalued company. 
This leads into the next question that Högholm et al. (2017) study do not answer and 
what is the interest of this study, answering for question of what happens when that 
increased demand decreases back to normal level. When Högholm et al. (2017) study 
analyzes the actual first buyback day´s average effect and concludes that it might be 
reasoned with increased demand, the author´s opinion is that study should have 
examined also what happens when demand drops, in this case when buybacks end.  
 
 
 
Table 5 (p. 45) capsulize the main results of the latest studies. As can be seen, abnormal 
returns have not disappeared, nor has it changed significantly as shown especially in 
Manconi et al. (2018) with a data set from 1998 to 2010. Manconi et al. (2018) study 
also divided buyback programs into different groups geographically to analyze abnormal 
return within -6 to 48 months using an event study. Another well documented effect 
with buybacks is that when dividends have not grown as much as economy, the 
difference can be explained by growing amount of repurchases as documented in 
Straehl et al. (2018).  Figure 11 presents geographical results from study by Manconi et 
Figure 11. The cumulative abnormal return (CAAR) for first day repurchase (Högholm et 
al. 2017). 
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al. (2018) that suggests that there can be found a significant difference within groups. 
America, excluding U.S., having the highest cumulative abnormal return on average 
when Europe has the worst. Interestingly, as can be seen CAR decreases in Europe three 
to five months after an announcement. Overall, results suggest that management has 
clearly managed to time the markets and buy their shares back with lower costs and to 
maximize long-term shareholder value. 
 
 
 
Study by Manconi et al. (2018) reports widely results about abnormal returns during an 
announcement and in a long-time horizon. The research reports 12-month alpha of 3,21 
% in Europe, but as all other studies it does not consider if the firms has bought back the 
shares and what are the day-to-day effects of stock buyback programs. Long-run event 
studies cited in Manconi et al. (2018) documents abnormal returns between 7,43 % 
(study by Rasbrant (2013) from Swedish markets) to -7,00 % (study by Rau and 
Vermaelen (2002) from United Kingdom). These studies, however, are mainly using an 
authorization as the event and will not even try to explain what happens in stock 
markets during the buybacks or when they quit acquisitions. Manconi et al. (2018) study 
reports that in Finnish stock markets the effects of stock buyback programs are:  
 
Figure 12. CAR geographically (Manconi et al. 2018.) 
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Table 4 captures the key figures in Finland. Based on the results only two event periods 
are statistically significant on 10 % level. This leads into the next question, should Finnish 
companies even use stock buyback programs, or should the money be invested better, 
if they don’t lead into bigger returns and if they don’t lead into bigger returns, is it 
possible to profit form the programs inside the program. Overall, when studies are 
focusing on the announcement or the overall effect of an authorization, they might give 
a false picture about stock buybacks. This study aims to give investors and to whom it 
may benefit a better overview about the short-term effects that will be a great 
information for day-traders. 
 
As can be captured from table 5 below, most of the latest studies have focused on 
subjects that are relatively easy to study and get updated information, announcement 
and authorizations. These, however, are enough studied subject by the authors opinion 
and the interesting part would is to achieve the new information to use in own trading 
decisions. The next chapter will give an overview about a new way how to study the 
effects short term using an event study.  
Announcement Effect RATS Method Calendar-Time Method
Event period CAR Event period Alpha Event Period Alpha
(-1, +1) 1.45* 12 months -4,43 12 months -0,3
(-2, +2) 0.62 24 months 5,87 24 months 0,23
(-3, +3) 0.87 36 months 18,41 36 months 0,41
48 months 25,69* 48 months 0,48
Table 4. Stock buyback programs effects in Finnish stock markets (Manconi et al. 2018). 
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Table 5. Recent studies of stock buyback effects. 
 
*RRS stands for relative repurchase price 
 
 
Author Title 
Period and 
method 
Contribution & Main 
results 
Andriosopoulos & Lasfer 
(2015) 
The Market 
Valuation of 
Share 
 Repurchases in 
Europe 
Announcement 
& Event study 
European data of N =970 
in 1997 to 2006.  
Results demonstrates CAR 
of 1.55 % ( -1, +1)  
Dittmar et al. (2016) 
Do Corporate 
Managers 
Know When 
 Their Shares 
are 
Undervalued? 
(…) 
Timing & 
Comparing 
RRPs* for 
frequent 
repurchases 
against 
infrequent 
U.S. data of N =2,237 in 
2004 to 2011. Infrequent  
repurchases earn alpha of 
0.6 % per month over 
three months and 0.3 % 
over 36 months versus 
frequent repurchases  
Straehl & Ibbotson (2017) 
The Long-Run 
Drivers of Stock 
Returns:  
Total Payouts 
and the Real 
Economy 
Total returns 
1871 - 2014 & 
Dividend and 
cash buyback 
model 
Long data period to 
examine the changes in 
total payouts 1871  
to 2014. Study describes 
that taking buybacks into 
the account has total 
payoff raised with growth 
of real economy. 
Högholm & Högholm 
(2017) 
Open Market 
Repurchase 
Programs (…) 
Announcement 
& Event study 
Finnish data of N =293 
from 1998 to 2013. Study  
found announcement 
effect of 2 % and CAAR 
1.51 % ( -2, +2) 
Manconi, Peyer & 
Vermaelen (2018) 
Are Buybacks 
Good for Long-
Term 
 Shareholder 
Value? (…) 
Announcement 
& Event study 
Non-U.S. N=9,034 
(benchmark U.S. 11,096) 
from 1998 to 2010.  
Study examines whether 
abnormal returns have 
disappeared as EMH 
suggests, concluding that 
it is still around 3 % 
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4. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 
To achieve the goal of studying short-term effects of buybacks and days with close to 
buybacks, the study will have the buyback dates hand-collected from Finnish stock 
markets. Next subchapters will describe the data and methodology used in this study. 
 
 
4.1. Data 
 
The study analyzes all firms that are listed before 6/2018 and are still a part of Nasdaq 
Helsinki overall index. This sample includes 130 different companies, 35 large, 43 
medium and 52 small sized firms. The sample period of data is from 2008 to 2017 and 
in that time, there are 7 215 days of stock repurchases in the sample. 68 of 130 firms 
had at least one day of stock repurchases in our sample period and 62 companies did 
not acquire a single share. Firm specific buybacks can be seen from Appendix 1. Daily 
buyback announcements and the stock price data have been collected from Nasdaq 
(Nasdaq). Ahlstrom stock data is not available before 03-12-2013, so a buyback sample 
of 66 days will be excluded from the analysis. This makes the total sample to 7 149 
buyback days. Daily index movements of our benchmark index, weighted OMX25, is also 
downloaded from Nasdaq (Nasdaq) exchange. For missing values of stock or index 
movement, the study is ignoring them as zeros.  
 
As can be seen from table 5, if companies did acquire shares, mean (median) is 106 
repurchase days (69,5 repurchase days), total sample period contains 2514 exchange 
days, so on average a company that use stock repurchases, do so on 4,22 % of trading 
days.  
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Days         Days without zero repurchases 
        
Mean 55,50 Mean 106,10 
Standard Error 8,76 Standard Error 14,23 
Median 3,50 Median 69,50 
Mode 0,00 Mode 138 
Kurtosis 8,48 Kurtosis 4,11 
Skewness 2,74 Skewness 1,99 
Range 571 Range 570 
Minimum 0,00 Minimum 1,00 
Maximum 571 Maximum 571 
Sum 7215 Sum 7215 
Count 130 Count 68 
 
 
For the data analyzes, firstly, we examine the data to get different time periods, which 
are a straight 10-days buyback event, following a ten day straight without any buybacks. 
With limitations, the data includes a total of 99 events that will be analyzed. For a second 
test, the study uses only events that have 15 days of buybacks without any zero-buy 
dates, following at least 10 days without any buybacks after that. With this limitation, 
the study has a total of 63 events in our data period. Thirdly, the study analyzes longer-
lasting buyback periods to analyze the effects after buybacks have continued for 25 days 
with a maximum of three days without any buybacks, following after-buyback period of 
at least 10 days without any repurchases. This way the study has also 63 events to 
analyze, some events differing from the second sample. The motivation for these 
portfolios has been discussed in introduction. Table 6 shows how events divide between 
years in our sample period.  
 
 
Table 7. Description of events yearly. 
 
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Total 
10-day events 24 10 8 14 3 3 8 7 8 14 99 
15-day events 14 6 4 10 2 1 8 6 4 8 63 
25-day events 15 9 6 6 2 0 3 8 6 8 63 
Table 6. Descriptive statistics of days 
48 
 
 
Overall, year 2008 dominates both in events and in single buyback days as can be seen 
from figure 12. Year 2008 had a total of 1877 buyback days, when 2013 is the lowest 
with only 324 repurchases. Based on the academic research, this could be explained 
with good financial situation in pre-2008 and an excess cash flow, together with a 
declining stock movement and aim to give support for the stock.  
 
 
 
 
Table 7 shows descriptive statistics from three event-studies that this study exams as 
well as both descriptive statistics from a logarithmic and a simple return dataset. From 
average effects can be seen that a shorter event period [-9; 10] reports a negative 
average return, when the highest average is with the longest studied program. Everyday 
stock returns while buying back shares are also shown to be 0,082 % (0,084 %) positive. 
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Figure 13. Total number of daily repurchases from 2008 to 2017. 
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For the last tests, this study is analyzing every buyback date as their own event, to 
achieve an answer whether buyback days are in fact profitable and statistically 
significant. For this test, market models required beta will be calculated from dates [-
250; -1]. Study analyzes all buybacks, including a sample of 7 149 buyback days, 1 377 
days from the large companies, 3 126 from medium and 2 646 buyback days from small 
companies. Profit will also be calculated as an annualized percent of profit.  
 
 
4.2. Methodology 
 
This study will use an event study to analyze the data for different time periods. The 
event study will be conducted using a market model to calculate the expected returns 
and so that the last day of repurchase is considered as our “event day”. The main event 
window includes a pre-event window with days of stock repurchases and an after-event 
window including days without repurchases. Figure 13 demonstrates how event study 
is formed adding a post-event window that is not analyzed in this study. The beta is 
calculated from 250 trading days using estimation-window as can be seen from figure 
13. This method is suggested in Mackinlay (1997) study, and it is the mode of annual 
trading day in the data period. This should get a solid estimate about the stock 
movement compared to the market portfolio. 
 
Event Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
[-9;10] 99 -0,126 % -0,287 % 8,151 % -20,160 % 34,982 %
[-14;10] 63 1,277 % 0,098 % 10,560 % -15,528 % 54,295 %
[-24;10] 63 3,484 % 3,762 % 12,934 % -44,272 % 60,173 %
[0;0] 7149 0,082 % 0,015 % 2,327 % -15,563 % 42,819 %
Simple return
[0; 0] 7149 0,084 % -0,006 % 2,376 % -14,538 % 53,322 %
Table 8. Descriptive statistics 
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An event study is described as a model which calculates the return of any security 
against a market portfolio. A market model is removing expected returns by multiplying 
market return by the beta. (Mackinlay 1997) An abnormal return is calculated as 
difference between an actual return and expected returns (Eq. 9). For the market model 
(Eq. 10 & 11), study uses ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. Simple returns for 
buyback day´s effects are calculated as the stock value at time t minus the stock value 
at time t-1 divided by the stock value at time t-1 (Eq. 12).  
 
(9)    𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡) 
 
(10)   𝑅𝑖,𝑇 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀,𝜏 + 𝜖𝑖,𝜏 
 
(11)                             𝐸[𝜖𝑖,𝑇] = 0  & 𝑉𝐴𝑅[𝜖𝑖,𝜏] = 𝜎𝜖𝑖
2  
 
(12)   Rit =
Pi−Pi−1
Pi−1
 
 
For events, returns are calculated with logarithmic returns as reported in equation 13. 
Cumulative abnormal returns will be compounded from abnormal returns (Eq 14.). 
Equation 15 shows how study calculates average abnormal return. 
 
(13)   𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛(1 + 𝑅𝑖,𝑡) 
 
Figure 14. Event study (MacKinlay 1997.) 
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(14)   𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝜏1,𝜏2) = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝜏2
𝑡=𝜏1
 
 
(15)   𝐴𝐴𝑅 =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑡=1  
 
Cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) will be calculated as equation 16 shows, 
dividing cumulative returns by the number of observations. Annualized profits will be 
calculated as equation 17 shows, using a potency of 250 divided by event days, 
amounting the mode of our sample periods yearly exchange dates in a calendar year.  
 
(16)   𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅(𝜏1,𝜏2) =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝜏1,𝜏2)
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
 
(17)   Annualized return = (((1 + 𝑟)(250/𝑡)) − 1)% 
 
After achieving results, the study will examine their significance using the cross-sectional 
T-test (Eq. 18 & 19). Results will be also checked by an adjusted version of standardized 
cross-sectional test, by Boehmer, Musumeci and Poulson (1991) (eq. 20). Boehmer et al. 
(1991) suggests that when there is not any event-inducted variance increase, 
standardized tests are good, but if the variance grows during an event-window, which 
might be the situation when there is one big buyer more, standardized test rejects a null 
hypothesis too easily. Boehmer et al. (1991) suggested a better test that is robust to 
event-inducted variance increases of returns, so their test will be used as well in this 
study.  
 
(18)   𝑇𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 =
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅(𝜏1,𝜏2)
?̂?2𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅(𝜏1,𝜏2)
 
 
(19)   ?̂?2𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅(𝜏1,𝜏2) =
1
𝑁(𝑁−𝑑)
∑ [𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝜏1, 𝜏2) − 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝜏1, 𝜏2)]
2𝑁
𝑖=1
 
 
(20)   𝑇𝐵𝑜𝑒ℎ𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝑒𝑡 𝑎𝑙. =
𝐶𝑆𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (𝑡1,𝑡2)
𝑆(𝐶𝑆𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ )
  
52 
 
5. RESULTS 
 
 
In this chapter study will focus on what kind of results the collected data provides. The 
first will describe results that this study found when analyzing every buyback date as its 
own event and show results of abnormal stock movement around buyback dates. The 
second subchapter will focus on the results from the shortest event-period, ten-days of 
buybacks, following a ten-days period without any buybacks. The third subchapter will 
include our event-period from 15-day buybacks, following ten days period of zero 
buybacks. The fourth, and last, subchapter will include our longest time period, 25-days 
of buybacks including a maximum of three days with zero buybacks, following a time 
period that does not include any buybacks.  
 
 
5.1. The buyback day effect 
 
The study analyses effects of every stock repurchase day from our data period of 2008 
to 2017 to see what results investors should be expecting during buybacks. The 
estimation window for beta is from t-250 to t-1, 250 trading days. DNA is missing some 
early values, but will be calculated from about 200 trading days, depending on the 
buyback date. Study analyses the sample as a whole (N = 7 149) and as groups divided 
per the market capitalization of companies, large (1 377 repurchase days), medium (3 
126) and small (2 646). Company specific size can be seen from appendix 1. Study 
calculates returns as logarithmic returns and simple returns and checks whether results 
are statistically significance by the cross-sectional t-test and Boehmer et al. test. Daily 
returns will be annualized considering 250 trading days in a year. 
 
Results from the portfolio including all stock buybacks show a logarithmic return of 
0,0815 %, a simple return of 0,0839 %, both statistically significant on 1 % level (table 
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11) Annualized returns are 22,602 % and 23,317 %, which suggests great profit 
opportunity.  
 
 
  
All  
(N = 7149) 
Large  
(N = 1377) 
Medium  
(N = 3126) 
Small 
(N = 2646) 
Log Return 0,0815 % (***) 0,0924 % (**) 0,0614 % 0,0997 % 
Tcross 2,9625 2,3397 1,6295 1,7825 
prob. 0,0031 0,0193 0,1032 0,0747 
Boehmer et al. 2,8937 2,2712 1,7019 1,3775 
prob. 0,0038 0,0231 0,0888 0,1684 
Annualized % 22,602 % 25,974 % 16,590 % 28,281 % 
Simple return 0,0839 % (***) 0,0888 % (**) 0,0605 % 0,1090 % 
Tcross 2,9848 2,2406 1,602 1,8823 
prob. 0,0028 0,0250 0,1092 0,0598 
Boehmer et al. 2,9356 2,2262 1,6843 1,4944 
prob. 0,0033 0,026 0,0921 0,1351 
Annualized % 23,317 % 24,838 % 16,309 % 31,300 % 
 
 
The portfolio of large companies suggests daily returns (annualized) of 0,0924 % (25,974 
%) and 0,0888% (24,838 %) for logarithmic and simple returns, respectively. Profits from 
large companies are statistically significant on 5 % level by both tests. The medium sized 
portfolio shows more modest returns, both statistically significant by Boehmer et al. 
test, but not by cross-sectional t-test. Logarithmic (simple) return is documented to be 
0,0614 % (0,0605 %) in our sample period.  
 
Small firms, however, show statistically significant results just by the cross-sectional t-
test, with highest profitability in logarithmic and simple returns, 0,0997 % and 0,1090 %, 
respectively.  Thus, results suggest statistically significant results on both tests just on 
big companies based on our analysis. This indicates that if one would like to profit in 
their day-trading from stock repurchases, it should be done using large listed companies 
in OMX Helsinki.  
 
Table 9. Daily abnormal returns around stock repurchases days. 
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Compared to the results documented by Manconi et al. (2018), the annualized abnormal 
return is significantly larger. Manoconi et al. (2018) study reported an average return of 
3,21 % in Europe with 12-month time period, when cited studies documented maximum 
of 7,43 % (Sweden). This shows a clear need for further research considering actual 
buybacks. Study reported also long-run returns by nation based on RATS (Calendar-time 
method), Finland documented as -4,43 % (-0.30 %). The results of this study suggest that 
stock buybacks generate positive abnormal returns, but on average the stock price 
decreases after buybacks.   
 
 
5.2. The 10-day portfolio 
 
Our ten-day portfolio is having 99 events and showing some cumulative average 
abnormal returns that are statistically significant both by Cross-sectional t-test and 
Boehmer et al. significance test. The estimation window is above-mentioned 250 trading 
days, a period that starts t-259 days before and ends at time t-10 [-259; -10], except DNA 
(containing one event) that has an estimation window of 189 days, because lack of data 
due IPO 2016. The study has a main event window of [-9; 10], with subside event 
windows of [-9; 0] [-4; 0] [-2; 0] [0; 0] and [1; 3] [1; 5] [1; 9] [1; 10].  
 
As table 8 shows, analysis from close-to-event time periods, [-4; 0] [-2; 0] and [1; 3] [1; 
5] are statistically significant on 5 % level both on the cross-sectional t-test and Boehmer 
et al. significance test. Study suggests that if one would like to profit from the short-term 
movements around days when a company will end its repurchase program, that would 
be possible buying five days pre-ending the program and short-selling at the last event 
day. This could be done by for example, buying shares from a company having ongoing 
buybacks before the silent period announced by the company itself. As annualized 
returns shows, two days pre-event day and three days after event day shows significant 
results of 75,90% and -58,51 %, respectively. When not counting for transaction costs, 
one could profit by buying shares from a company that will end repurchases after three 
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days, and short sell in the first day that the company will not buy any shares for three to 
nine days.  
 
 
Event CAAR (%) Tcross prob. 
Boehmer 
 et al. 
prob. Annualized 
[-9; 10] -0,130 -0,153 0,8782 -0,307 0,7589   
[-9; 0] 0,780 1,429 0,1531 1,292 0,1964   
[-4; 0] 0,830** 2,050 0,0404 1,9746 0,0483 51,18 % 
[-2; 0] 0,680** 2,004 0,0451 2,1299 0,0332 75,90 % 
[0; 0] 0,260 1,341 0,1799 1,355 0,1754   
[1; 3] -1,050*** -2,578 0,0099 -2,4623 0,0138 -58,51 % 
[1; 5] -1,250** -2,681 0,0074 -2,8338 0,0046 -46,68 % 
[1; 9] -1,310* -2,113 0,0346 -1,9269 0,054 -30,67 % 
[1; 10] -0,910 -1,445 0,1484 -1,4443 0,1487   
 
 
 
 
Figure 14 demonstrations the average stock movement around the main event window. 
Figure shows abnormal returns starting to cumulate in around five days (-4 + day-0) 
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Table 10. The results from [-9; 10] event-study. 
Figure 15. Plotted 20-days CAAR movement. 
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before a company ends its buyback program, rising to 0,782 %. After repurchases are 
done, the value of a share starts to decline for around four days, falling for cumulative -
0,468 %. Interestingly, we can see a drop in cumulative abnormal returns in around 
seventh day, which this study cannot explain. For rising CAAR in end of event period (day 
ten) might be explained by a market normalization after buybacks or markets reacting 
before financial statements that companies are giving after a quiet period.  Overall, 
study finds statistically significant results around short-term buyback periods, but 
considering the main event window (20 days), study finds insignificant.  
 
 
5.3. The 15-day portfolio 
 
Study analyses a sample of 63 events with at least fifteen days of continuous stock 
repurchases following a time period of at least 10 days where a firm do not acquire any 
shares. An estimation window is used to calculate beta using a time period of 250 days 
starting from t-264 and ending in t-15, except DNA that contains only 184 days because 
of IPO 2016. Study analyses cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) in the main 
event-period of -14 to 10, with subside event-periods of [-14; 0], [-9; 0], [-4; 0], [-3; 0], 
[0; 0] and [1;3], [1; 5], [1; 9] and [1; 10].  
 
Table 9 describes results, analysis suggests that with longer-lasting stock repurchase 
programs closer-to-events are again statistically significant both by cross-sectional t-test 
and Boehmer et al. test. Study finds statistically significant cumulative abnormal returns 
for the last five and four days of 1,1 % and 1,33 %, respectively, before a firm ends their 
buyback program. However, study finds only event period of five days of no-repurchase 
days as statistically significant on 10 % level, which suggests lower effects comparing to 
shorter buyback programs. The last day of repurchases however study finds positive and 
statistically significant on 5 % level, average of 0,57 percent per day or 314,11 % 
annualized. Thus, results indicate that longer lasting repurchase programs are more 
profitable in a short-term analysis comparing to shorter-term events that include only a 
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straight ten days of stock repurchases. The overall effect of main the event window (25-
days), study finds not to be statistically significant.   
 
 
Event CAAR (%) Tcross prob. 
Boehmer 
 et al. 
prob. Annualized 
[-14; 10] 1,280 0,9601 0,337 0,5566 0,5778   
[-14; 0] 1,740 1,6618 0,0966 1,1707 0,2417   
[-9; 0] 1,110 1,5069 0,1318 1,2687 0,2046   
[-4; 0] 1,100* 2,0044 0,045 1,7998 0,0719 72,81 % 
[-3; 0] 1,330** 2,5738 0,0101 2,4139 0,0158 128,36 % 
[0; 0] 0,570** 2,1494 0,0316 2,1257 0,0335 314,11 % 
[1; 3] -0,760 -1,8793 0,0602 -1,5918 0,1114   
[1; 5] -0,920* -1,7588 0,0786 -1,9038 0,0569 -37,01 % 
[1; 9] -0,870 -1,3402 0,1802 -1,0485 0,2944   
[1; 10] -0,460 -0,6513 0,5148 -0,6366 0,5244  
 
 
 
 
Figure 15 shows plotted results from the 25-day event study, 15 days with buybacks and 
10 days without. As figure 15 shows, cumulative abnormal returns are again falling at 
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Table 11. The results from [-14; 10] event-study. 
Figure 16. Plotted 25-days CAAR movement. 
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time t-7 for an unexplained reason but starts to cumulate into a strong growth after 
that. Study finds the last buyback date, marked as zero, as the highest cumulated 
average abnormal return, standing at 1,735 %. Cumulative returns start declining after 
a company ends their buybacks, staying still at 0,811 % positive at its lowest. Thus, 
results suggest that when a company end their stock repurchases, it has a significant 
effect on short-term stock price. The biggest percentual decline happen directly after 
the end of repurchases.  
 
 
5.4. The 25-day portfolio 
 
The event study of longer repurchase programs include events of at least 25 buyback 
days of buybacks, which contains a maximum of three days without stock buybacks, 
following ten-days without buybacks includes 63 events. This type of open-market 
repurchases are more common in long-lasting programs where a company might aim to 
distribute excess capital to shareholders without influencing the actual share price. 
Estimation values are calculated using 250 trading days, starting at t-274 and ending at 
t-25, except one event from DNA, containing only 174 trading days data in the 
estimation window when calculation for beta because of IPO 2016. Study analyses 
event-periods of the main event window, [-24; 10], with subside event-windows of [-24; 
0], [-19; 0], [-14; 0], [-9; 0], [-4; 0]; [-2; 0] and [0; 0] with post event windows of [1; 3], [1; 
5], [1; 9] and [1, 10].  
 
Table 10 documents results from the analysis. Events that contain stock repurchases 
days, are positive and mainly statistically significant. The main event window of 35 
trading days, achieves a cumulated average abnormal return of 3,48 %, statistically 
significant on 5 % level. Events of [-24; 0], [-19; 0], [-9; 0], [-4; 0] and [-2; 0] cumulates of 
2,760 %, 2,490 %, 1,430 %, 1,110 % and 1,430 % CAAR, respectively. Annualized 
abnormal returns show the highest cumulated average abnormal return during the last 
stock repurchase days, 226,49 %. The study, however, finds no significant effect on 
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ending a stock repurchase program with the 25-day portfolio. Study still reports negative 
effects on the stock price with events of [1;3], [1;5] and [1;9]. This indicates together 
with the results from previous portfolios that there might be a small negative effect in 
the stock price when a company quits its program. 
 
 
 
 
Plotted results together with a trendline (figure 16) shows a rising effect on longer stock 
repurchase programs considering CAAR. Companies that do acquire their shares for a 
longer period, do not receive as negative effects from investor when ending their 
program. The highest CAAR during a 34-day event (-24; 9) is at time t1, which indicates 
that stocks tend to rise even after a company ends its stock repurchases.  Even also 
longer repurchase programs do have a negative effect on day -7, their lowest CAAR point 
is in the beginning of the buybacks. This indicates that if a company wishes to achieve 
greater positive short-term effects on the stock price, they should implement their stock 
repurchases in a longer time period.  
 
 
 
Event CAAR (%) Tcross prob. 
Boehmer 
 et al. 
prob. Annualized 
[-24; 10] 3,480** 2,1383 0,0325 2,0071 0,0447 27,68 % 
[-24; 0] 2,760** 2,1050 0,0353 1,9726 0,0485 31,29 % 
[-19; 0] 2,490* 1,8516 0,0641 1,7763 0,0757 35,99 % 
[-14; 0] 1,650 1,5495 0,1213 1,3343 0,1821   
[-9; 0] 1,430* 1,8267 0,0677 1,7259 0,0844 42,61 % 
[-4; 0] 1,110* 1,9295 0,0537 2,2035 0,0276 73,66 % 
[-2; 0] 1,430*** 2,8000 0,0051 3,2709 0,0011 226,49 % 
[0; 0] 0,370 % 1,2254 0,2204 1,3252 0,1851   
[1; 3] -0,370 % 0,8966 0,37 -1,0154 0,3099   
[1; 5] -0,690 % -1,2661 0,2055 -1,6923 0,0906   
[1; 9] -0,240 % -0,3407 0,7334 -0,4777 0,6328   
[1; 10] 0,720 % 0,8538 0,3932 0,576 0,5646   
Table 12. The results from [-24; 10] event-study. 
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Thus, considering our hypotheses, the study accepts H1 as results suggest there is a 
positive effect during buybacks when analyzing only the daily impact of repurchases. As 
well as study accepts H2 because of portfolios of ten and fifteen days of buybacks shows 
statistically significant negative results following the period, this however, can be argued 
when our 25-day portfolio did not find negative but not statistically significant results. 
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Figure 17. Plotted 35-days CAAR movement. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
 
This master´s thesis aimed to answer what happens during and after the buybacks in 
short-term considering open market programs in Finland for time period of 2008 to 
2017.  Being the most used program, open market program is widely studied across 
academics. However, the previous studies have focused on announcement or overall 
long-term effect without considering differences between days that firms acquire shares 
and days when they do not. When previous study from Manconi et al. (2018) reported 
negative long-term abnormal returns from Finland, this study finds significant positive 
effects during actual buybacks and negative effects directly after repurchases using 
event study. This is a key finding for ongoing academic literature about stock buybacks. 
Stock repurchase programs should be examined more deeply to get better results how 
do the abnormal returns cumulate. 
 
Study uses an event-study to investigate how CAAR develops around days when a 
company is buying back shares using open market program and what happens in the 
stock price when they end the program. The portfolio formation, however, could not be 
found from previous literature being one of the first studies to examine short-term 
impacts of actual buybacks. Study motivates the reasons why to form portfolios based 
on the previous research about ex-dividend impact and characteristics on a typical 
repurchase program. The study chooses to use portfolios of ten and fifteen days of 
continuous buybacks and a portfolio that includes 25-days of buybacks with an 
allowance that the time period can have a maximum of three days without any 
buybacks. All portfolios are followed by a ten-day time period when the company does 
not buy a single share to investigate the impact of ending a repurchase program.  
 
The study is answering to hypotheses H1: daily stock buyback have a positive effect on 
the stock price and H2: Ending stock buybacks have a negative effect on the stock price. 
Study finds a positive effect of 0,0815 % during stock repurchases and accepts H1 to be 
statistically significant on 1 % level. When study examines the impact of ending the stock 
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buyback program using a portfolio formation method and an event study, results 
suggests that the stock price declines on average. Thus, H2 is also accepted. 
 
The study finds a positive effect especially for last five days of stock repurchases and 
negative effects from after-buyback period of 1 to 5 days. Results suggest that even past 
literature has documented mainly positive effects from repurchases, there can be found 
unique characteristics inside timeline. This information may benefit both investors and 
companies depending their goal considering a portfolio formation or what do managers 
aim to achieve from a stock buyback program.   
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APPENDIX 1. Firm specific summary statistics.  
Size Company Days 10-day Events 15-day Events 25-day Events 
Lage Ahlstrom-Munksjö* 138 3 2 2 
Lage Amer Sports 160 4 2 1 
Lage Cargotec 41 1 0 1 
Lage Citycon 1 0 0 0 
Lage DNA 75 1 1 1 
Lage Elisa 28 1 1 1 
Lage Finnair 42 2 2 1 
Lage Fiskars 129 4 3 3 
Lage Fortum 0 0 0 0 
Lage Huhtamäki 0 0 0 0 
Lage Kemira 0 0 0 0 
Lage Kesko B 53 0 0 0 
Lage Kojamo 0 0 0 0 
Lage KONE 68 1 0 0 
Lage Konecranes 35 1 1 1 
Lage Metso 25 2 0 0 
Lage Metsä Board 0 0 0 0 
Lage Neste 23 1 1 0 
Lage Nokia 393 11 9 9 
Lage Nokian Renkaat 0 0 0 0 
Lage Nordea 0 0 0 0 
Lage Orion B 32 1 0 0 
Lage Outokumpu 18 1 0 0 
Lage Sampo 39 1 1 0 
Lage Sanoma 103 4 3 2 
Lage SSAB 0 0 0 0 
Lage Stora Enso 0 0 0 0 
Lage Telia Company 0 0 0 0 
Lage Terveystalo 0 0 0 0 
Lage Tieto 12 1 0 0 
Lage UPM 0 0 0 0 
Lage Uponor 14 1 0 0 
Lage Valmet 0 0 0 0 
Lage Wärtsilä 0 0 0 0 
Lage YIT 14 0 0 0 
Medium Aspo 132 1 0 0 
Medium Caverion 15 1 1 0 
Medium Cramo 0 0 0 0 
Medium Lassila & Tikanoja 112 4 2 2 
Medium Lehto Group 0 0 0 0 
Medium Outotec 5 0 0 0 
Medium Ponsse 91 3 1 1 
Medium Pöyry 108 1 0 1 
Medium Ramirent 82 3 2 2 
Medium Robit 5 0 0 0 
Medium Scanfil 0 0 0 0 
Medium SRV Yhtiöt 185 1 1 1 
Medium Tikkurila 24 1 1 0 
Medium Vaisala 340 2 1 2 
Medium Altia 0 0 0 0 
Medium Atria 68 0 0 1 
Medium HKScan 2 0 0 0 
Medium Olvi 17 1 0 0 
Medium Raisio 267 4 4 4 
Medium Rapala VMC 571 3 2 1 
Medium Rovio Entertainment 0 0 0 0 
Medium Suominen 39 0 0 0 
Medium Oriola B 11 1 0 0 
Medium Pihlajalinna 0 0 0 0 
Medium Revenio Group 61 3 2 1 
Medium Alma Media 64 1 1 1 
Medium Kamux 0 0 0 0 
Medium Stockmann 0 0 0 0 
Medium Tokmanni Group 0 0 0 0 
Medium Viking Line 0 0 0 0 
Medium Aktia Pankki 133 3 3 2 
Medium Asiakastieto Group 0 0 0 0 
Medium CapMan 40 0 0 1 
Medium eQ 48 1 0 0 
Medium Evli Pankki 0 0 0 0 
Medium Suomen Hoivatilat 0 0 0 0 
Medium Taaleri 0 0 0 0 
Medium Technopolis 131 0 0 2 
Medium Ålandsbanken 21 0 0 0 
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Medium Basware 120 0 0 0 
Medium Bittium 0 0 0 0 
Medium F-Secure 293 7 6 6 
Medium Teleste 141 3 2 2 
Small Afarak Group 154 2 2 1 
Small Endomines 0 0 0 0 
Small Sotkamo Silver 0 0 0 0 
Small Aspocomp Group 0 0 0 0 
Small Componenta 0 0 0 0 
Small Consti Yhtiöt 0 0 0 0 
Small Dovre Group 16 0 0 0 
Small Efore 71 0 0 0 
Small Elecster 0 0 0 0 
Small Etteplan 294 5 2 2 
Small Exel Composites 0 0 0 0 
Small Glaston 0 0 0 0 
Small Incap 0 0 0 0 
Small Kesla 0 0 0 0 
Small Neo Industrial 43 0 0 0 
Small Nurminen Logistics 0 0 0 0 
Small Raute 16 0 0 0 
Small Talenom 0 0 0 0 
Small Tulikivi A 91 0 0 1 
Small Uutechnic Group 0 0 0 0 
Small Valoe 0 0 0 0 
Small Wulff-yhtiöt 115 0 0 0 
Small Yleiselektroniikka 0 0 0 0 
Small Apetit 46 1 1 0 
Small Harvia 0 0 0 0 
Small Honkarakenne 94 0 0 0 
Small Marimekko 0 0 0 0 
Small Martela 0 0 0 0 
Small Saga Furs 0 0 0 0 
Small Biohit 0 0 0 0 
Small Silmäasema 0 0 0 0 
Small Ilkka-Yhtymä 0 0 0 0 
Small Keskisuomalainen 1 0 0 0 
Small Kotipizza 0 0 0 0 
Small Pohjois-Karjalan Kirjapaino 0 0 0 0 
Small Restamax 72 0 0 0 
Small Investors House 0 0 0 0 
Small Orava Asuntorahasto 0 0 0 0 
Small Panostaja 138 4 3 3 
Small Sievi Capital 109 0 0 0 
Small Digia 123 1 0 2 
Small Digitalist Group 0 0 0 0 
Small Innofactor 271 1 0 2 
Small Nixu 0 0 0 0 
Small QPR Software 400 0 0 0 
Small Qt Group 0 0 0 0 
Small Siili Solutions 0 0 0 0 
Small Solteq 454 0 0 0 
Small Soprano 138 0 0 0 
Small SSH Communications Security 0 0 0 0 
Small Tecnotree 0 0 0 0 
Small Trainers’ House 0 0 0 0 
  SUM 7215 99 63 63 
* Ahlstrom-Munksjö´s 66 buyback days excluded because lack of data. 
